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SEPARATION RHETORIC AND ITS 
RELEVANCE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. By Philip 
Hamburger. 1 Harvard University Press. 2002. Pp. 514. 
$49.95. 
Adam M. Samaha2 
A degree of conventional constitutional interpretation is 
backward-looking, sometimes even nostalgic. Adjudication de-
mands innovation, of course. But fidelity to a reconstructed past 
is an embedded interpretive value, which means that conclusions 
about the complexion of our national heritage can have conse-
quences for federal constitutional law. An apparent case in point 
is establishment clause precedent and the rhetoric of church-
state "separation" -a slogan that Philip Hamburger seeks to vi-
tiate in his latest work, Separation of Church and State. 
This book alone places Professor Hamburger among the 
most serious and industrious of the "separation" critics. By can-
vassing an impressive amount of primary source material, em-
phasizing public discourse, and exploring religious, political, and 
social movements, Hamburger helps to explain what various 
Americans thought about religion-government relations over 
approximately two centuries. His ultimate conclusions about 
"separation" are stark, yet also undergirded by something better 
than the wishful thinking of a beholden advocate. The book has 
and will receive attention from scholars and judges.3 
Separation's analysis of rhetoric, religion, and intolerance is 
worth remembering for many reasons, but objections to its use in 
I. John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
2. Visiting Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to 
Dan Farber, David Elsberg, Noah Feldman, Mike Paulsen, and Jaynie Leung, among 
others. Mistakes are mine. 
3. Though perhaps not always for the author's intended purposes. Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2504-05, 2507 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing both 
Hamburger and the separation metaphor favorably in arguing for doctrine that mini-
mizes religious strife); see MarciA. Hamilton, "Separation": From Epithet ro Constitu-
tional Norm, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1433 (2002) (book review). 
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establishment clause adjudication are probably insurmountable. 
The book's treatment of the founding era leaves open significant 
issues germane to an originalist understanding, and the post-
First Amendment material is harrowing but mostly irrelevant to 
present-day litigation. These observations are not necessarily 
criticisms of what Hamburger has accomplished; perhaps he did 
not intend to advocate any particular position on modern consti-
tutional law. But of course authorial intent need not equate with 
a text's received meaning at any subsequent reading. And, what-
ever the author's view, Separation's sources and conclusions may 
pertain to contemporary constitutional disputes. This review 
considers the book for that connection. 
I. CONTEXT FOR AND THEMES IN SEPARATION 
Church-state "separation" has been promoted by a variety 
of Americans for a variety of purposes, as Hamburger docu-
ments. Every constitutional lawyer is aware of Thomas Jeffer-
son's use of the metaphor: in 1802, President Jefferson drafted a 
letter responding to the laments of a Connecticut Baptists asso-
ciation, in which he characterized the establishment clause as 
"building a wall of separation between Church & State." (p. 161) 
This word-image was vivid and potent, and Jefferson was neither 
the first4 nor the last to use it. Tocqueville attributed the concept 
to Catholic interviewees in 1831-32.5 Three decades later, P.T. 
Barnum derided religious superstition while endorsing church-
state separation.6 In 1875, President Grant picked U.f, the line in 
opposing government funding for parochial schools. Many years 
4. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Govern-
ment in American Constitutional History 5-6 (U. of Chicago Press, 1965) (distinguishing 
Roger Williams) sense of the image from Jefferson's); John Locke, A Letter Concerning 
Toleration (1685), in 6 The Works of John Locke 21 (T. Davison, 1801) (advocating limits 
on ecclesiastical power in civil affairs, particularly over liberty and property "upon the 
account of' religious differences, using separationist terms: "the church itself is a thing 
absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides 
are fixed and immoveable."); see also Thomas Paine, Age of Reason (1794), in Thomas 
Paine: Collected Writings 667 (Library Classics, 1995) (referring to "[t]he adulterous con-
nection of church and state" that trenched upon open discussion of religious matters). 
5. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 308 (Vintage Books, 1990) 
(1835) ("[T]hey differed upon matters of detail alone, and that they all attributed the 
peaceful dominion of religion in their country mainly to the separation of church and 
state. I do not hesitate to affirm that during my stay in America I did not meet a single 
individual, of the clergy or the laity, who was not of the same opinion on this point."). 
6. P.T. Barnum, The Humbugs of the World, Account of Humbugs, Delusions, Im-
positions, Quackeries, Deceits, and Deceivers Generally, in All Ages 415 (Carelton, 1866). 
7. Anson P. Stokes and Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 433 
(Greenwood Press, 1964) ("Leave the matter of religion to the family, altar, the church, 
and the private school supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the church and 
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later, Democratic presidential candidates AI Smith and Jack 
Kennedy each professed their devotion to an "absolute" separa-
tion of church and state.8 And in 1878 and again in 1947, the 
United States Supreme Court quoted Jefferson's letter and ele-
vated what may have been a popular slogan into an apparently 
justiciable concept.9 
Importation of a separationist mind-set into federal consti-
tutional law nevertheless was, and is, deeply troubling to many. 
A chief concern has been that a separation principle produces 
too many restraints on government action that redounds to the 
benefit of religion, to a point where it indicates or dictates a 
secular society hostile to religious liberty. Largely for that rea-
son, Everson rivals Marbury among the opinions most vilified by 
those who support the result reached. 
Hamburger adds other objections. He concludes that "the 
constitutional authority for separation is without historical foun-
dation."10 (p. 481) It may not be entirely clear what brand of 
church-state "separation" is being eliminated here, but the au-
thor does deny that it was a popular slogan or principle before 
the First Amendment was ratified. The project is much more 
ambitious than contributing to an understanding of the founding 
generation, however. Separation also attempts to track Ameri-
can use of the metaphor during the fourteen decades between 
Jefferson's letter and the decision in Everson. And it turns out 
that many lesser-known proponents of church-state separation 
are now far less reputable than even P.T. Barnum. So Ham-
burger's work not only cabins the historical roots of separation 
rhetoric, it also taints them. His research places Jefferson's views 
at the margins and associates subsequent adherents with bigotry, 
usually of an anti-Catholic stripe; 11 with "theological liberals, es-
pecially anti-Christian 'secularists"'; and with a particular vision 
of religion that emphasizes the individual over hierarchy and in-
stitutions. (pp. 10-11, 14-16) For Hamburger, then, church-state 
separation might be a useful concept in some respects, but 
state forever separate."). It is not clear whether Grant was one of Barnum's "sucker[s)." 
8. AI Smith, Letter, Atlantic Monthly 728 (May, 1927); Transcript of Kennedy Talk 
to Ministers and Questions and Answers, N.Y. Times 22 (Sept. 13, 1960). 
9. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878)). 
10. Accord Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856 (1995) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring). 
II. Cf. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.) 
(condemning tests for prohibited government aid that turn on whether a school is "per-
vasively sectarian": "This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now."). 
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"separation ought not be assumed to have any special legitimacy 
as an early American and thus constitutional idea. On the con-
trary, precisely because of its history-both its lack of constitu-
tional authority and its development in response to prejudice-
the idea of separation should, at best, be viewed with suspi-
cion."12 (p. 483) 
To evaluate such claims about the historical or constitu-
tional authority for "the idea of separation," we need to consider 
the ways in which the author chose to examine the phrase in 
question. Many methods were available, and there is certainly no 
one "correct" way to study the history of an idea. But just as 
surely, some approaches are more relevant to modern constitu-
tional law than others. Separation does not directly defend its 
relevance to today's lawsuits, which might not be the author's 
concern. By isolating the book's method of study, however, we 
can make our own judgments. 
It seems that Hamburger's methods and sources contribute 
to at least three perspectives on "separation of church and 
state": (1) As rhetoric or slogan. Hamburger's analysis is plainly, 
even primarily, about the history of separation rhetoric, its popu-
larity, and the motives of its sloganeers. From this vantage, 
"separation" is easy to see but probably least significant to con-
stitutional law. (2) As concept or general principle. Also explored 
is the general idea and rationale expressed by church-state 
"separation." This conceptual angle is related but not identical 
to the study of rhetoric and slogan-insofar as it is possible to 
distinguish ideas and principles from their authors and adher-
ents. General principles are perhaps more difficult to pin down 
than are sloganeers, and general principles sometimes seem too 
abstract to resolve concrete constitutional problems. But their 
use in adjudication is apparent even if their clarity is not: to 
elaborate constitutional text, courts often employ principles; and 
these principles are commonly informed by historical sources 
close to the time at which the text was adopted, by experience 
since then, or by both. Separation therefore bears on this sort of 
decision-making. (3) As program, rule, or agenda. Finally, seg-
ments of the book suggest more specific ramifications for a sepa-
ration principle or concept. Granted, Hamburger does not issue 
a discrete and programmatic definition of "separation,"13 which 
12. See also Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J.L. & Pol. 7, 37 
(2002) (calling for rejectionof the phrase). 
13. Hamburger indicates that separation means some distinction between church 
and state; often means elimination of laws supporting, instituting, "or otherwise 
establishing" religion; and perhaps "point[s) to ... a distance, segregation, or absence of 
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might be a function of his focus on rhetoric and concepts, or 
simply vagueness on the part of those who employed the phrase. 
Still, the book provides some information on the agenda of those 
who by 1791 opposed existing state relationships with religion, 
and those who thereafter touted "separation" as a matter of ef-
fective rhetoric or guiding principle. 
II. REVIEW AND SUPPLEMENTAL THOUGHTS, 
IN TWO CHRONOLOGICAL STAGES 
The analysis below proceeds in two stages: up until the gen-
eration that ratified the First Amendment (which obviously can 
inform originalist evaluations of that text), and then after (which 
is not so plainly within the boundaries of conventional interpre-
tive sources). A concluding section adds some broader com-
ments on the relevance of Hamburger's account to today's con-
stitutional law. 
A. THE SETTING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Separation's first principal question is "whether separation 
was the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment," (p. 
9) and the book begins by exploring the rhetorical (dis )use of the 
phrase prior to ratification of the federal Bill of Rights. Here 
Hamburger consults the written records of Christian "religious 
dissenters" 14 and their opponents, primarily in America and 
England. These sources provide fascinating examples of rhetoric 
dating to the sixteenth century, and Hamburger does the curious 
a favor by providing extensive quotations from surviving tracts. 
On this matter, Separation's essential finding is that pre-
Amendment religious dissenters rarely called for a "separation 
of church and state" much less a "separation of religion and gov-
ernment." Instead, "separation" was a goal that dissenters were 
occasionally and unfairly accused of seeking. For example, at the 
end of the sixteenth century Richard Hooker alleged that Eng-
lish dissenters had implied the untenable principle "that the 
Church and the Commonwealth are two both distinct and sepa-
rate societies ... and the walles of separation between these two 
lishing" religion; and perhaps "point[s] to ... a distance, segregation, or absence of con-
tact between church and state. Rather than simply forbid civil laws respecting an estab-
lishment of religion [however defined], it has more ambitiously tended to prohibit con-
tact between religious and civil institutions." (pp. 2-3) 
14. This class is not formally defined. Hamburger does indicate that he is referring 
to members of religious sects who opposed "state establishments," (p. 19) but that term is 
not specified by an easy-to-locate set of attributes, either. 
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must for ever be upheld." (p. 36) On this side of the Atlantic, 
evangelical dissenters were sometimes indicted for proposing a 
separation of all religion and government. This attack was 
probably quite effective, assuming the audience believed that the 
charge was accurate and that social order and civil government 
depended on religion and a resulting morality. (p. 66) Secular 
reason and government power might still skirt chaos absent the 
fear of God, (p. 70) and so perhaps government had to be better 
able to encourage religious exercise than the dissenters' views 
might permit (p. 71 n.7). 
This is not to say that church-state integration was a popular 
concept. Assorted dissenters in Europe and America attacked 
the "union" of church and state as an adulterous corruption of 
the former. (p. 55) Similarly, Hamburger contends that pro-
establishment ministers resented the accusation that church and 
state had been "united" or "blended," defending the status quo 
as an acceptable alliance or affiliation between distinct institu-
tions. (pp. 65, 72-73) Defenders of official churches like Hooker 
could accept distinctions between church and commonwealth, 
between ecclesiastical and secular affairs, while at the same time 
disparaging complete severance of the faithful from the citi-
zenry. (p. 37) Indeed, these general principles are not far re-
moved from how Separation describes the position of establish-
ment assailants. Dissenters themselves saw critical connections 
among vibrant religious practice, widespread morality, and a 
functioning state; and Hamburger emphasizes that they avoided 
rhetoric disparaging civil-religious connections or supporting 
church-state separation. (pp. 73-75, 78) Of course these dissent-
ers opposed "establishments" by definition, and some were con-
cerned about clerical involvement in politics. (p. 83) Still, they 
did not reject a moral or religious foundation for law. (pp. 76-78) 
They may have "avoided convoluted distinctions about the per-
missible degree or type of connection between religion and gov-
ernment," but they "had every reason to seek religious liberty 
and no reason to demand the disconnection of religion and gov-
ernment." (p. 78) 
In important respects, then, Hamburger attributes to both 
establishment ministers and religious dissenters similar concep-
tions of church-state and religion-government relations. True, 
certain strains of Christian thought during the sixteenth through 
eighteenth centuries indicate yearnings for detachment from the 
wilderness of an impure world and government, or even from 
other religious creeds (pp. 21-32, 38-52); and there were a few 
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more secular, fringe critics of the clergy and institutional religion 
(pp. 53, 59-62). Yet Hamburger cannot find strong evidence that 
dissenters (or much of anyone) advocated segregation of religion 
and government or repudiated a relationship of mutual support. 
(p. 23) Rather, dissenting Protestants "left open the possibility of 
other, nonestablishment connections." (p. 28) 
At this juncture, attention to programmatics might be re-
quired if we want to convert these rhetorical and conceptual 
findings into constitutional lessons. 15 If, as matters of general 
principle, dissenters supported "distinctions" and opposed "un-
ion" or "establishment" yet refrained from demanding "separa-
tion" and could accept "nonestablishment connections," pre-
cisely what was their practical, affirmative vision for 
government-religion relations? Did they have one? Separation's 
discussion leaves doubts. Even on the implausible assumption 
that America's religious dissenters spoke with one voice, serious 
uncertainty about the operational meaning of their anti-
establishment arguments would persist if they "avoided convo-
luted distinctions about the permissible degree or type of con-
nection between religion and government." (p. 78) Those dis-
tinctions constitute the constitutional issues that have taunted 
the courts for decades. 
Constructively, Hamburger puts forward a counter-principle 
promoted by dissenters: some form of "religious liberty" differ-
ent from "separation." (p. 89) But both terms need additional 
content before they become mutually exclusive; and a disjunc-
tion is perhaps more difficult because, as Hamburger observes, 
official punishment for religious difference was largely aban-
doned in America by the late 1700s. (pp. 89-90) Dissenters were 
likely most concerned with government benefits, privileges, and 
protections. 
Assuming it is desirable to assemble a more specific pro-
gram of state-level legal reform that religious dissenters did or 
15. Some might search only for general principle here, but I am not convinced that 
this can yield much guidance for constitutional law. In any event, identifying specific his-
torical controversies is plainly one way to inform principle. See Douglas Laycock, "Non-
coercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 
Val. U. L. Rev. 37, 49-50 (1991) ("Noncoercive"). More programmatic inquiries, like the 
state of state establishments or alternative legal regimes proposed by dissenters, are 
hardly incontestable; but that might be cause for downgrading the role of both in consti-
tutional adjudication. Cf. Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the 
Constitution, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 839, 842 (1986) ("History ordinarily should not be 
expected, however, to provide specific answers to the specific problems that bedevil the 
Court."). 
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would endorse, what sources are available? Identifying a nega-
tive agenda is probably easiest. The specifics of state laws di-
rected at religion, and their actual operation, help define what 
religious dissenters opposed- although not necessarily why or 
exactly what was objectionable. Separation does not dwell on the 
details of the challenged "establishments," however, which were 
not all of a piece.16 Hamburger does helpfully single out as dis-
senter priorities their opposition to taxes for ministers' salaries, 
and to exclusive rights to conduct legal marriages in a preferred 
class of clergy. (p. 90) Even if Separation had departed from its 
primary themes to give more details, though, additional informa-
tion would be needed to determine what if any alternative pro-
gram could have existed. Eliminating "establishment" is not a 
precise conclusion, even if we had a working definition of it. For 
example, two different ways to eliminate a system of govern-
ment-sponsored benefits for only favored religious sects are (1) 
abolition of the benefits, or (2) extension to those excluded. 
Separation suggests some other building blocks for a dis-
senter program of religion-government relations; but the con-
tours are somewhat fuzzy. For instance, Hamburger helps spec-
ify dissenter demands for state constitutional amendments 
regarding "religious liberty" by categorizing them under two 
sub-principles: equal rights- "a freedom from laws that dis-
criminated on the basis of religious differences"; and no legisla-
tion cognizant of religion-"a request that law take no notice of 
religion," which was "an approach that denied civil government 
any jurisdiction over religion." (pp. 94, 100) How these ideas dif-
fered from possible versions of "separation" is not clear, nor is 
there much certainty about how these counter-principles play 
out in live controversies. One extension is the thought that few 
religious dissenters disavowed all government-derived benefits: 
many supported government recognition for their marriage ritu-
als and protection of religious property; some others endorsed 
legislative exemptions from secular demands for minorities like 
Quakers. (pp. 90, 93, 101, 107) In addition, some founding era 
state constitutions prohibited compelled worship and payments 
for the support of clergy or churches. 17 Hamburger calls them 
16. For additional specifics and perspectives, see, for example, Gerard V. Bradley, 
Church·State Relationships in America ch. 2 (Greenwood Press, 1987), Thomas J. Curry, 
The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment 
chs. 5·7 (Oxford, 1986), and Anson P. Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States ch. 
5 (Harper, 1950). 
17. These clauses came in several forms. E.g., N.J. Const. art. XVIII (1776), re· 
printed in Francis N. Thorpe, cd., 5 The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Char· 
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departures from the "standard pattern of antiestablishment de-
mands" and parallel to free-exercise based rights against com-
pulsion. (p. 94 n.10) On the other hand, we cannot ignore their 
apparent tension with, for example, sect-neutral but tax-financed 
or government-prompted religious worship.18 
To confidently conclude that the founders rejected separa-
tion as a proper principle or resulting program, one must con-
front another concrete issue: the state practice of excluding 
clergy from holding certain offices in government- certainly a 
conceivable plank in a separation platform. (pp. 184-85) Ham-
burger does so. He reports that he found no sound evidence that, 
during the founding era, such exclusions were justified with ref-
erence to separation of church and state or of religion and gov-
ernment. (p. 79) To the contrary, he points out that Massachu-
setts and South Carolina, which officially supported preferred 
religions, also maintained such exclusions; that dissenters usually 
ignored the question; and that the exclusions were supported by 
ters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore 
Forming the United States of America 2597 (Government Printing Office, 1909); Pa. 
Const. art. IX, § 3 (1790) ("[N]o man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or sup-
port any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent; that no human 
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of con-
science .... "), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 Federal and State Constitutions at 3100; cf. Ga. 
Const. art. IV, § 5 (1789) ("All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without 
being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own.") 
(emphasis added), reprinted in Thorpe, 2 Federal and State Constitutions at 789; Vt. Dec-
laration of Rights art. III (1787) ("[N]o man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend 
any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, 
contrary to the dictates of his conscience ... Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of 
Christians ought to observe the Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of reli-
gious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God.") 
(emphasis added), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3752. These 
provisions and others can be browsed at 1st Amendment Online, <httpJ/lstam.umn.edu>. 
18. See also Laycock, Noncoercive at 47 (cited in note 15) (arguing that, in Virginia 
and Maryland, "[s]tate assistance to churches was rejected as an establishment, even with 
the right to designate the recipient of the tax, ... and in Maryland, to escape the tax alto-
gether by declaring nonbelief'). Hamburger makes the intriguing suggestion that New 
York and South Carolina "prohibited an establishment by" adding sect-neutral free ex-
ercise clauses. (p. 99 & n.20) (emphasis added) South Carolina does appear to have 
eliminated its declaration that Protestantism was the state's "established" religion at the 
same time that it adopted a broader free exercise guarantee. See S.C. Const. art. 
XXXVIII (1778), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3255-57 (cited 
in note 17); S.C. Canst. art. VIII (1790), reprinted in Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Consti-
tutions at 3264 (cited in note 17); Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States at 434 
(cited in note 16). New York's situation is less amenable to the description, however. See 
Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States at 405-06 (cited in note 17). That state's 
federal constitutional ratifying convention also indicated independent meaning for free 
exercise and antiestablishment clauses: the convention declared both principles when 
they ratified the Federal Constitution. (p. 99 n.21); Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights 
and What It Means Today 189 (U. of Oklahoma Press, 1957). 
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a variety of ideas about the proper role of clergy and civil magis-
trates, perhaps even anti-Catholic bias. (pp. 79-83, 87) Yet the 
exclusions probably deserve greater weight than Separation 
gives, inasmuch as the book's mission is to study something 
other than rhetoric.19 Regardless of the arguments audibly 
voiced in their favor, these bars were common at the time the 
First Amendment was drafted and ratified. Indeed, Hamburger 
asserts that ministerial exclusions "were often paired with ex-
emptions from civil obligations, such as the obligation to pay 
taxes or serve in the military," (p. 84) which are likewise poten-
tial components of a separation program. Regardless, the critics 
failed to eliminate ministerial exclusions, whatever force the 
separation accusation had, however attractive was Noah Web-
ster's message that "[r]eligion and policy ought ever to go hand 
in hand," (p. 88) whatever the tensions with then-prevailing no-
tions of free exercise, and however irrelevant this history is to 
contemporary constitutionallaw.20 
Having emphasized state-level dissent, Separation briefly 
recounts the drafting history of the First Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution. Hamburger begins with the plausible point 
that religious dissenters would have been skeptical of any provi-
sion that might prohibit legislatures from protecting the free ex-
ercise of religion. (pp. 106-07) We should be careful, therefore, 
not to over-read demands that government not take "cogni-
zance" of religion.21 (p. 102) In any event, Hamburger contends, 
an unqualified no-cognizance standard was not what Madison 
proposed in his first draft of amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution on June 8, 1789,22 nor what Congress referred and the 
19. This broader mission seems apparent. For example, Hamburger looks beyond 
slogans in confining the meaning of attacks on the status quo. Locke once described the 
church as "a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth," which 
Hamburger characterizes as "merely an expression of his pervasive and hardly original 
argument about the difference between religious and civil jurisdiction." (p. 54) In 1767, 
Britain's James Burgh asked future generations to "[b)uild an impenetrable wall of sepa-
ration between things sacred and civil," which Hamburger asserts "came close" to a wall 
of separation between church and state. (p. 57) Paine likewise "came close" in Age of 
Reason, (p. 60) which Hamburger asserts "did not necessarily refer to all types of church-
state connections" in its condemnation of "adulterous connection" (p. 62). 
20. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
21. This was a principle that Madison used in drafting the famous Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in Virginia. Everson v. Board of Educ. of 
Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (appendix) ("We maintain therefore that in mat-
ters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that 
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."). 
22. See 1 Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States at the First 
Session of the First Congress at 46 (Gales & Seaton, 1826) (June 8, 1789); Bernard 
Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 202 
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state legislatures ratified. (p. 105) Indeed the House of Repre-
sentatives ultimately rejected a version of the religion clauses 
that would have stated, "Congress shall make no laws touching 
religion or [infringing?] the rights of conscience."23 Hamburger 
concludes that "Madison reconciled himself to language less 
sweeping than that he had used in 1785 [in Virginia], and Con-
gress adopted a moderated version of the no-cognizance stan-
dard, which did not forbid all legislation respecting religion." (p. 
107) 
The drafting history of the religion clauses may be a side-
light for Separation, and this essay is not the place for a compre-
hensive rendition of that process. But the topic is sufficiently im-
portant to warrant some additions to the record. While the text 
ratified by the states "said nothing about separation," (id.) nei-
ther did it use the words "religious liberty," "coercion," "neu-
trality," "sect preferences," "accommodation," or a variety of 
other phrasings that might or might not have provided additional 
guidance for constitutional interpretation. In fact, it appears that 
no state constitution of that era nor any amendment recom-
mended by a state ratifying convention employed the precise 
terminology ultimately ratified as our First Amendment.24 
Moreover, Congress dispensed with several drafts regarding re-
ligion before the members reached agreement. In addition to re-
jecting Madison's first draft and one referring to laws "touching" 
religion, Congress also set aside an establishment clause that 
would have confirmed that it lacked authority to make law es-
(Madison House, 1977). 
23. According to the collection cited by Hamburger on this point-Helen E. Veit, 
et al., eds., Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal 
Congress (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1991)-one of three sources for this proposal includes 
the word "infringing." Id at 150, 153, 158 (quoting The Daily Advertiser, The Gazette of 
the United States, and The Congressional Register); see also 1 Annals of Congress 759 
(Gales & Seaton, 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789). According to another of those sources, Repre-
sentative Sam Livermore, who proposed this language, apparently did not intend a sub-
stantive change from the text that it replaced ("no religion shall be established by law, 
nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed"). Veit, Creating the Bill of Rights at 
150-51. In any case, the language referred to the Senate was: "Congress shall make no 
law establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of 
Conscience be infringed." Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind at 240 (cited in note 
22). 
24. Cf., e.g., N.J. Const. art. XIX (1776) ("That there shall be no establishment of 
any one religious sect in this Province, in preference to another .... ") (emphasis added), 
reprinted in Thorpe, 5 Federal and State Constitutions at 2597 (cited in note 17); Dum-
bauld, The Bill of Rights at 189 (cited in note 18) (reprinting New York's declarations 
and recommended amendments of July 26, 1788: the delegates "Do declare and make 
known .... that no Religious Sect or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law 
in preference of others") (emphasis added). 
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tablishing "one religious sect or society in preference to oth-
ers,"25 as well as the Senate's final draft: "Congress shall make 
no law establishing articles of faith, or a mode of worship. "26 
Whether the congressional drafters rejected such alternative 
language because they wanted a meaning broader, or otherwise 
different, or because of stylistic or other reasons-or whether 
any other relevant cohort of Americans understood the text in 
the same way-is subject to fair and perhaps irreconcilable dif-
ferences of opinion. But there is a sound argument that the 
drafting history and meaning of the federal establishment clause 
were unique?7 
There is also substantial reason to believe that the federal 
clause was uniquely restrictive. The institution of a new central 
government raised acute concerns about the scope of its author-
ity, and the constitutional amendments pressed by Madison and 
others during the very first Congress were a response to them.28 
So why would founding era criticism of state-level relationships 
between government and religion round out concerns about such 
national government relationships?29 Even some opponents of 
"separation" might agree that the importance of decentralized 
power at that time supports at least one distinct limitation that 
had no state-side analogue: preventing the national legislature 
from diSestablishing locally and officially preferred faiths-in 
that sense, "mak[ing]" a "law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion. "30 Hamburger mentions and disagrees with the opinion of 
some that the clause should be interpreted to restrict only the 
25. 1 Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America 70 
(Gales & Seaton, 1820) (Sept. 3, 1789). It is well known that Madison tried but failed to 
include additional express limitations on state government power, including protection 
for "the equal rights of conscience." Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind at 177, 202-
03 (cited in note 22). The House agreed to language similar to Madison's, but the Senate 
balked. Id at 240, 242-44; 1 Journal of the Senate 72 (Sept. 7, 1789) (rejecting House arti-
cle 14). 
26. Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind at 242 (cited in note 22); 1 Journal of 
the Senate 77 (Sept. 9, 1789) (cited in note 25). 
27. For additional detail on establishment clause drafting history, see, for example, 
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original In-
tent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875 (1986). 
28. See, e.g., 1 Journal of the Senate 73 (Sept. 8, 1789) (cited in note 25) (preamble 
to the congressional resolution referring amendments to the state legislatures). 
29. For one rather severe version of this line of argument, see Leonard W. Levy, 
The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment 89, 121-22 (U. of North 
Carolina Press, 1986). See also DanielL. Dreisbach and John D. Whaley, What the Wall 
Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson's "Wall of Separation" Metaphor, 16 Canst. 
Comm. 627, 649-54 (1999) (collecting sources). 
30. U.S. Canst., Amend. I (emphasis added); see Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, 
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause 
Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 321 (1986). 
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federal government's ability to interfere with state establish-
ments, (p. 106 n.40) but he does not address the possibility that 
the clause must be interpreted differently from analogous state 
constitutional provisions or the agenda of dissenters from state 
regimes. 
Separation's attention to religious dissenters and their state-
level battles in pre-Amendment America is one legitimate 
method for beginning to reconstruct constitutionally relevant 
history. Yet a complete investigation into the original meaning 
or intent of the establishment clause should answer more ques-
tions-whether dissenter positions are fairly ascertainable, dif-
fered from any useful definition of separation principles or pro-
grams, and are an appropriate proxy for establishment clause 
meaning. 
B. THE POST-TEXT RISE OF SEPARATION RHETORIC 
Doubts about whether Separation is apposite to modern 
constitutional law escalate when one turns to its review of post-
ratification separation rhetoric. The story is enticing, illuminat-
ing, and depressing. But it raises disturbing possibilities if em-
ployed as a backlight to contemporary constitutional adjudica-
tion. 
According to Hamburger, separation slogans were first 
popularly used by Jefferson's political supporters during the 
1800 presidential campaign. Far from any high-minded principle, 
these phrases were rhetorical tools for attracting anti-
establishment voters while simultaneously chastening pro-
Federalist clergy for their intervention into a partisan political 
campaign. (p. 111) Certain religious leaders had vocally and vig-
orously opposed Jefferson's election, assaulting him as a non-
Christian infidel who might undermine religion and morality in 
America. (pp. 112-14) As one reverend reasoned, because the 
Federal Constitution did not foreclose the election of "a mani-
fest enemy to the religion of Christ, in a Christian nation," vot-
ing was the only way to close the door. (p. 116) Perhaps strug-
gling to defend Jefferson's prior writings indicating an 
individual's right to declare the nonexistence of God and that 
the Bible was an inappropriate teaching tool for the schools (pp. 
116, 119), his supporters sometimes shot back in blunderbuss 
fashion. Aside from denials, some publicly demanded disconnec-
tion of religion and politics-something that Republicans did not 
necessarily practice themselves (pp. 140-43)-and suggested that 
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their opponents supported an actual union of church and state 
(p. 120). 
Apparently, "the Republican demand for a separation of re-
ligion and government ... resonated among the people," and 
pro-Federalist ministers discontinued such sermons sometime 
after the election. (p. 129) Not long after, Jefferson used separa-
tion to explicate the First Amendment, which Hamburger asso-
ciates with the then-President's now-developed fear of clerical 
tyranny over the individual mind and the clergy's unhealthy 
propagation of entrenched custom. (pp. 147-49) Separation does 
not quite explain how separation rhetoric could be perceived by 
Republicans as appropriate and effective in 1800 and yet still 
have been a poignant accusation a decade earlier. But the book 
does note an interesting intersection of politics, religion, and 
rhetoric. 
If campaign strategy helped vault separation into popular 
discourse, Hamburger's explanation for its subsequent staying 
power is more disturbing. No doubt some were honestly con-
cerned that traditional religious hierarchies and mores were in-
hibiting human progress through reason, science, and the secular 
arts. (pp. 132-36) But Hamburger views this justification for 
"separation" as a minority position that cannot adequately ex-
plain its rise. Too many Americans accepted interconnections of 
religion, morality, and government. (p. 189) Instead, Separation 
posits the confluence of three trends: not just (1) skepticism of 
organized or hierarchical religion, but also (2) the growing force 
of anti-Catholic nativists, and (3) a generalized movement to-
ward specialization, division of labor, and segregation of Ameri-
can life, which tended to isolate the influence of religion within a 
private sphere. (pp. 14-16, 252, 265) Although the relative im-
portance of each factor is difficult to judge,_ Hamburger main-
tains that "the separation of church and state became popular 
mostly as an anti-Catholic and more broadly antiecclesiastical 
conception of religious liberty." (p. 252) 
The 1830s through the 1850s are pivotal decades for Separa-
tion. They are portrayed as the time at which church-state "sepa-
ration" became an acceptable and even popular goal. Because 
fears about the influence of clergy or organized religion were 
pronounced with regard to Catholics-who some believed acted 
on remote control from Rome (pp. 203-05, 234-35, 237 n.llO)-
Protestant clergy had an opportunity to redirect individualism-
based complaints to the Catholic Church. (p. 201) Some Protes-
tants perceived (or at least portrayed) Catholicism as an institu-
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tion that inherently burdened freedom of thought, freedom of 
conscience, and individualism in preference to hierarchy, top-
down dictates, and tradition-bound superstition.31 (pp. 204-05) In 
this way, Catholicism might conflict with an evolution of Protes-
tantism to emphasize personal faith, (pp. 203-04) as well as the 
felt preconditions for America's democracy. Regardless, Ham-
burger's conclusions permit us to characterize 1800s separation-
ism as a theologically rooted concept-in fact, partly founded on 
sect-based bigotry. 
One mid-century example of separation's apparent public 
acceptance occurred during an otherwise well-known 1840 de-
bate over school funding. In New York City, government fund-
ing was forbidden to all sectarian schools, yet the schools receiv-
ing the money were hardly secular: they required readings from 
the King James version of the Bible and some of their textbooks 
were unfriendly to Catholicism.32 (pp. 219-20, 223 n.83) Al-
though the Public School Society ultimately offered to delete 
certain anti-Catholic textbook passages, (p. 223) that body and 
its allies also opposed funding for Catholic schools on the gen-
eral principles of church-state separation and voluntary support 
for religion (p. 222). Hamburger helps explain this apparent con-
tradiction by pointing to a Protestant conception of Catholicism 
as an institutional and hierarchical church, while Protestantism 
operated through individuals. A Protestant audience might well 
conclude that calls for separation of "church" and state referred 
only to the Catholic Church. This context and other "code 
words" (p. 222) indicate that an important part of the New York 
opposition to private school funding was opposition to Catholi-
cism. 
3 I. That Catholicism was also the religion of many new immigrants did not augur 
well for tolerance, either. (p. 202) Certain Catholic leaders fed such fears, however, by 
advocating world conversion, overt intolerance for other faiths, and organized political 
participation as bloc voters. (pp. 209-10, 227) Hamburger notes that Pope Gregory XVI 
deepened the political vulnerabilities in the United States when, in 1832, he not only de-
nounced separation of church and state and lauded their union, but also challenged mod-
ern liberty of conscience, opinion, and the press. (pp. 230-32 & n.96); see also John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. and James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 279, 302-03 (2001); Marc D. Stern, School Vouchers- The Church-State Debate 
that Really Isn't, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 977, 987 (1999) ("(T]wentieth century Americans make 
the mistake of measuring the import of that anti-Catholic response against the post-
Vatican II Catholic Church .... "). 
32. See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2503 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) ("When it decided these 20th century Establishment Clause cases, the Court 
d1d not deny that an earlier American society might have found a less clear-cut 
church/state separation compatible with social tranquility."). 
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The parallel ascendance of nativist politics and separation 
rhetoric is confirmed in the later half of the nineteenth century. 
In the 1870s and 1880s, as Hamburger describes it, "anti-
Christian" secularists sought relatively broad federal constitu-
tional amendments separating government from religious or-
ganizations or creeds. (pp. 287-90, 294-97, 314) These secular 
liberals were essentially equal-opportunity skeptics who feared 
the influence of religion writ large.33 But their agenda was over-
run. An intersecting movement for "separation" was sect-
discriminatory in motive and strategy, drawing support from 
those who drew lines between "real" Americans and the Catho-
lic Church. Accordingly, another amendment was offered by 
Republican presidential aspirant James G. Blaine in the wake of 
President Grant's call. (pp. 297-98, 322-25) Rather than address-
ing all aspects of government-religion relations, it targeted state 
funding for parochial schools. That focus could join the interests 
of secular liberals and anti-Catholic nativists. (pp. 324-25) While 
both efforts to amend the Federal Constitution failed, the Prot-
estant-Republican-anti-Catholic movement, which also traveled 
under the banner of separation, was the more popular. (p. 321) 
The secularist effort ultimately imploded, (pp. 330-31) yet 
Blaine-like amendments were adopted in a majority of the states 
by 189034 and the Republican, Democratic, and Prohibition Par-
ties expressed support for church-state separation. (pp. 324, 326 
& n.102) 
Blaine's proposal has always been a facially inconvenient 
fact for those who want to remain faithful to original meaning 
while still enforcing First Amendment limits against state action 
through the Fourteenth-especially if the establishment clause is 
to be read broadly enough to inhibit government financing of 
parochial schools. Why was more constitutional text offered if 
the old document already accomplished the goal? It turns out, 
though, that the issue is not very straightforward, and Separation 
indirectly helps to confirm that. Like the drafting history of the 
First Amendment, this subject is partly outside the scope of 
Hamburger's analysis. Nevertheless, his coverage of nineteenth 
century constitutional movements generates thoughts about Ar-
ticle V failures. 
33. Their specific agenda included eliminating religious tax exemptions and other 
government benefits, prohibiting clerical involvement in political questions, and repeal-
ing religiously motivated Sunday laws. (pp. 304-05, 308-09) 
34. Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. 38,43 
(1992). 
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First of all, one may simply conclude that the best answer to 
the same debatable constitutional question can be different in a 
different era, after historical sources and received wisdom are 
"examined in the crucible of litigation. "35 Putting that option 
aside, it is also possible for failed amendment proponents to see 
a need for new text that isn't there, or to seek additions out of 
uncertainty and caution (at least if there is no ex ante rule that 
estops subsequent litigation after an Article V defeat).36 Many 
constitutional clauses, including some in the Fourteenth and 
First Amendments, do not evince specificity as their highest 
value; and there is no instruction manual for interpreting the 
Constitution. Furthermore, unless we concede judicial infallibil-
ity on constitutional questions, then Article V can be used to 
seek correction of court error-for example, an erroneously nar-
row reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Just because the 
corrective was unsuccessful, which might be for any number of 
reasons, does not mean that the judiciary was right all along or 
that it has no business self-correcting thereafter. Furthermore, as 
Separation's emphasis on extra-judicial social movements helps 
to suggest, there are other reasons to promote a constitutional 
amendment than changing a constitution. Stirring up controversy 
and animus is a perfectly understandable goal for any good na-
tivist, and a constitutional campaign can be a good vehicle for 
doing so. 
Consider as well that Blaine's proposal as amended and 
passed in the House was not the same text that was narrowly de-
feated in the Senate. The successful House version restated the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment, prefaced by "No State 
shall make any law," and then added a relatively specific prohi-
bition regarding religious sects and state support for public 
schools.38 The failed Senate version included several additional 
35. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,52 (1985). 
36. Hamburger argues that, in fact, these amendment proponents believed that the 
same result could not be achieved through litigation and legitimate interpretation, (pp. 
435-38) but Separation itself notes that some who advocated a robust separation pointed 
to constitutional norms, or maintained that their amendment proposals converted justi-
fied inferences into explicit constitutional declarations (pp. 223, 236, 240 n.114, 246-47, 
275 n.11, 301-02 & n.36). 
37. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721-27 (1999) (spinning yams about the Elev-
enth Amendment). Hamburger asserts that there is no evidence that post-Fourteenth 
Amendment proposals like Blaine's were drafted in response to the Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), but Green, while noting some contrary statements, advises us to 
consider that Congress' attention was on "the School Question" rather than the proper 
mterpretatwn of the Fourteenth Amendment. Green, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. at 68-69 (cited in 
note 34). 
38. Blaine's version read: "[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the sup-
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restraints, and also a caveat. In part it stated, "And no such par-
ticular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or in-
stitution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan 
of credit .... This article shall not be construed to prohibit the 
reading of the Bible in any school or institution. "39 That caveat 
closely aligns the proposal with the nativist-Protestant-
Republican agenda that Hamburger elucidates. On the other 
hand, such particularities underscore the peculiar character of 
the proposal under consideration and the range of reasons any 
one member of Congress might have opposed it. Finally, 
Blaine's and the Liberals' proposals were not the only notable 
amendment movements that fell short during this period. The 
National Reform Association, as Hamburger notes, pushed for 
an amendment to the preamble which would have declared 
America's Christianity.40 (pp. 291-93, 326 n.101) Insofar as any 
port of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands de-
voted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money 
so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations." 
Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States at 434 (cited in note 7) (quoting 
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875)). The House Judiciary Committee added 
language which, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, left Congress without explicit au-
thority to enforce the proposal: "This article shall not vest, enlarge, or diminish legisla-
tive power in the Congress." Green, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. at 58 (cited in note 34) (quoting 
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Cong. Rec. 5189 (1876)). 
39. The full text read: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required 
as a qualification to any office or public trust under any State. No public 
property and no public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the 
authority of, the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or municipal 
corporation, shall be appropriated to or made or used for the support of any 
school, educational or other institution under the control of any religious or 
anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein . the particular 
creed or tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or 
denomination shall be taught. And no such particular creed or tenets shall be 
read or taught in any school or institution supported in whole or in part by such 
revenue or loan of credit; and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall be 
made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or to 
promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be construed to prohibit the 
reading of the Bible in any school or institution; and it shall not have the effect 
to impair rights of property already vested. 
Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States at 434 (cited in note 7) (quoting 
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 Cong. Rec. 5453, 5595 (1876)); see also Green, 36 Am. J.L. Hist. 
at 61 (cited in note 34) ("Apparently, members of the [Senate Judiciary Committee] were 
impressed with the [caveat) because it allowed the Senators to have it both ways .... "); 
Stokes, 2 Church and State in the United States at 723-28 (cited in note 16). 
40. See also Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution: 
The Case Against Religious Correctness 148-49 (Norton, 1996) (contending that the Fed-
eral Constitution's secular character is partly confirmed by the failure of such amend-
ment efforts); Stokes, 2 Church and State in the United States at 260 (cited in note 16); 3 
id., at 587-88 (noting an unsuccessful 1888 proposal that would have mandated free pub-
lic schools with education "in virtue, morality, and the principles of the Christian relig-
ion"). 
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rejected amendment may be used to construe constitutional text 
left intact, there are several rational inferences that might be 
drawn here. 
The final chapters of Separation are the grimmest. They 
cover the closing years of the 1800s through Everson, and they 
link an emboldened and bigoted nativism with a popular pen-
chant for separation slogans. (pp. 342, 352-54, 359, 366-68, 391) 
Hamburger notes some doubts among religionists regarding the 
possible negative effect of a separation principle on morality and 
social accountability, (p. 389) and that different proponents had 
different understandings about just what separation meant; but 
he finds substantial support for separation as a constitutional 
norm in the era leading up to Everson. By the early twentieth 
century a bevy of groups and writers saw separation as "an 
'American' constitutional right," (p. 391) part of a set of indi-
vidually oriented and nationwide liberties that could not be lim-
ited to any one level of government (pp. 434-35, 448-49). The 
Court, therefore, applied the clauses of the First Amendment to 
the states within the "cultural circumstances created by nativ-
ism." (p. 448) 
However, Hamburger argues, a significant component of 
that popular support can be traced to movements with which few 
present-day Americans would proudly associate: "the modern 
myth of separation omits any discussion of nativist sentiment in 
America and, above all, omits any mention of the Ku Klux Klan. 
Yet nativists ... continued to distinguish themselves as the lead-
ing proponents of this ideal." (p. 399) In one version of the Klan 
oath, new members dedicated themselves not only to free public 
schools and free speech, but also to white supremacy and separa-
tion of church and state. (p. 409) They may have endorsed Bible 
readings in public schools as well, (p. 410 n.46) but they certainly 
opposed any influence of the Catholic Church on American life. 
The Klan is all the more important to Hamburger's connection 
of separation and bigotry, because the author of Everson, Justice 
Hugo Black, was affiliated with the organization during his rise 
to political prominence in Alabama.41 (p. 423) "A Baptist, Black 
opposed the consumption of alcohol and harbored deep suspi-
cions of Catholicism." (Id.) Black apparently delivered the oath 
41. Two excuses for Black's membership are political expedience and local-juror 
~ersuasion, neither of which demonstrate the sort of personal risk-taking that helps de· 
fme modern heroes. Nor do they differentiate Justice Black from many who have both 
made serious mistakes and serious contributions to legal progress. 
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about white supremacy and separation to entering Klansmen. (p. 
426) 
Which brings us to Separation's punch line. Hamburger re-
counts Everson as a case instigated by anti-Catholic nativists, 
(pp. 455-57) authored by an ex-Klansman, and best understood 
as a Pyrrhic victory for Catholics and others opposing separation 
and seeking government benefits (pp. 461-63)."2 Having weath-
ered criticism for his Klan membership at the outset of his judi-
cial career, the case can be viewed as a double-sided opportunity 
for Justice Black, part legal and part public relations: "Black ex-
pected that his disarming conclusion would lead Catholics to 
think that they had succeeded in staving off the practical conse-
quences of separation. The justice, however, knew better .... " 
(p. 462) All nine members of the Court concurred in a separa-
tion principle, and its potential bite was indicated a year later in 
McCollum.43 Justice Black again wrote for the majority, which 
persisted in employing a church-state separation principle-
although this time in a way that rolled back access to public 
school students for a variety of religious instructors, not just 
Catholics. The McCollum litigation thus ended with the first suc-
cessful establishment clause objection in Supreme Court history, 
but the Court had gone "far beyond the Protestant version of 
separation of church and state" to "a relatively secular version." 
(pp. 476-77) 
By the middle of the twentieth century, then, Americans 
saw separation "as their historic religious liberty, as a fundamen-
tal American freedom, and even as a constitutional right pro-
tected by the First Amendment." (p. 479) 
III. SEPARATION AND ITS RELEVANCE 
Despite the critique and supplemental analysis provided 
above, Separation's primary themes are essentially intact. Sepa-
42. Hamburger also calls Justice Frankfurter "[a] secularized Jew" with "a distinct 
distaste for Catholicism." (p. 474) Although he rejects the notion of a "Masonic conspir-
acy to adopt the idea of separation," Hamburger does estimate the number of Mason 
Justices at no fewer than seven. (p. 451 & n.l46) Nonetheless, it is impossible to identify 
the Supreme Court of this era with an exclusively nativist program, see West Virginia Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); id at 643-44 (Black, J., concurring) (relying 
primarily on a religious-freedom rationale); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Hamburger makes no such claim. 
43. Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 
209-12 (1948) (invalidating a public school program that set aside time during the school 
day for students to attend religious instruction delivered by private parties on school 
grounds, with parental consent). 
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ration rhetoric was apparently not at its peak in 1791, and some 
disreputable characters invoked the slogan thereafter. In certain 
respects, a principle of church-state separation might also be un-
dermined by Hamburger's research, assuming it is sensible to in-
quire whether that concept comports with founding era under-
standings and subsequent tradition. The precise content of any 
separation principle, however, is open to serious debate both in 
its historical and contemporary forms. Neither Separation the 
book nor "separation" the concept can provide terribly precise 
guidance about whether any one rule or agenda is implied or ap-
propriate. 
Where, then, should this lead constitutional law? Perhaps 
nowhere at all, or perhaps to a point already reached by the ju-
diciary. For the Supreme Court at least, the metaphor of "sepa-
ration" has recently but certainly declined in prevalence. It 
seems to have been a decade since even a concurring opinion in-
voked the separation slogan in a positive light,44 and longer since 
a majority signed on.45 That rhetoric is essentially left to dis-
sents.46 
Moreover, separation has not been an obviously outcome-
determinative principle in litigation, regardless of what Everson 
might have intimated. Absent separation rhetoric, the Court still 
enforces government limits with reference to the establishment 
clause.47 Even Lemon v. Kurtzman,48 which may be viewed as 
44. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599-601 & n.l (1992) (Biackmun, J., concurring). 
Justice Blackmun's concurrence was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, but the 
latter has not shown interest in promoting the phrase since, and she authored an opinion 
that reworked Lemon's entanglement prong. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) 
("Interaction between church and state is inevitable .... "). 
45. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (an exemption for religious organizations inTi-
tle VII did not "impermissibly entangle(] church and state; the statute effectuates a more 
complete separation of the two"); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) 
("Some limited and incidental entanglement between church and state authority is inevi-
table in a complex modem society, but the concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful 
signpost.") (citations omitted); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The 
concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure of speech .... But the metaphor itself is 
not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact 
exists .... "); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 
696-98 (1994) (plurality opinion of Souter, J.) (discussing impermissible fusion of gov-
ernmental and religious functions, but not invoking the separation metaphor and invali-
dating a "separate" school district). 
46. E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2485 (2002) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,873 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
47. Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 709-
10; Lee, 505 U.S. at 599. Granted, when judged by its agenda and judgments, the sympa-
thies of the current Court usually rest more with the government and the religious faith-
ful. See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2473; Good News Club v. Milford Centr. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 
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the epitome of segarationism, survives the late demise of the 
separation slogan. And Everson itself is the best evidence that 
the converse is also true: the Court can say it stands ready to en-
sure church-state "separation" and nevertheless permit govern-
ment action that benefits religious institutions or individuals. 
Consider as well McDaniel v. Paty,50 in which the Court invali-
dated a state's exclusion of clergy from the role of constitutional 
convention delegate. Despite a related historical lineage dating 
to the founding, a rather literal relationship with a separation 
program, and an apparently positive reference to separation in 
the decision,51 time and modern constitutional law had passed 
these exclusions by, and the Court acted accordingly. Separation 
rhetoric and principle guaranteed neither the implementation of 
every conceivable component of a program for church-state dis-
connection, nor the insulation of public policy from religious in-
fluence and experience.52 
Judicial tendencies aside, there are several defensible 
grounds for rejecting a constitutional principle of separation. 
Perhaps "separation of church and state" is so imprecise that it 
cannot be useful in deciding real controversies.53 Or, the term 
might now be misleading considering the results in recent cases. 
Or, perhaps there is a competing, superseding, or otherwise su-
perior principle with which to begin establishment clause analy-
sis. None of these grounds, however, depend upon which groups 
or individuals bandied the phrase in the past nor whether they 
harbored illicit motives. 
To be sure, revulsion is an understandable consequence of 
learning that one's principle looks a lot like the rhetoric of hate-
fu1 bigots. And the connection, even if logically strained, can be 
cause for caution. If nothing else, there is the risk that an other-
wise helpfu1 term will be mistaken for code and a spiteful 
102 (2001); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.); Agostini, 521 U.S. 
at 208-09; Capitol Sq. Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (plural-
ity opinion of Scalia, J.); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
845-46 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sck Dist, 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993); Lamb's 
Chapelv. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993). 
48. 403 U.S. 602,612-14 (1971). 
49. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 314. 
50. 435 u.s. 618 (1978). 
51. See id at 622 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (asserting that "[t]he purpose 
of the several States in providing for disqualification was primarily to assure the success 
of a new political experiment, the separation of church and state"). 
52. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,312 (1952). 
53. The Court has intermittently sent that message for decades. See, e.g., Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,672-73 (1984); Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Educ. of Sch. 
Dist. No. 71,333 U.S. 203,212-13 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
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agenda. But there is a cost to reticence, too. Removing words 
and their images from our constitutional vocabulary can hinder 
communication, understanding, and problem solving. Attempts 
to partner separation and hate, moreover, will be beside the 
point for anyone willing and able to evaluate ideas and their 
ramifications without binding them down to the agenda of those 
who have mouthed the words in the past. Finally, consider the 
alternative: disavowing terminology or even ideas, no matter 
how useful, if invoked by otherwise repugnant movements or 
groups. It is worth remembering that new Klan members 
pledged themselves to freedom of speech and press as well as 
church-state separation and white supremacy. (p. 409) And of 
course there is no guarantee that religious exercise in the public 
sphere would remain untouched by analogous taint. After all, 
politicians like George Wallace fought to keep God's Word, but 
only one color of His children, in Alabama's finest public 
schools.54 
Any effort to preserve the viability of a separation principle 
rests on an important assumption, however: that a program of 
religion- or church-state "separation" can be constructed free 
from prohibited anti-religious or anti-Catholic features, while 
still so related to common use of the term that the label is useful. 
In other words, it must be logically, conceptually possible to pu-
rify the separation principle, to separate separation from hostil-
ity. That potential should exist, so long as its meaning does not 
solely depend on the term's heritage, but also on the content we 
choose to attribute to separation and unacceptable hostility. 
Thus "separation of church and state" (or even separation of re-
ligion and government) at least means that the two cannot be ut-
terly integrated, which is a conclusion that is not in serious dis-
pute in this country. On the other hand and doctrinally, 
separation has never meant that religious practice and belief are 
incompatible with American democracy, entailing a faith-
expelling final solution. 55 And surely a separation principle can 
be fashioned to mean more than the absence of union, less than 
expulsion, and not sheer hostility to religious belief and practice. 
54. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Philip B. Kurland, The Regents' 
Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . .. , "in Philip B. Kurland, ed., Church 
and State: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment 3 (U. of Chicago Press, 1975) 
(quoting one United States Representative reacting to Engel v. Vitale: "They put the Ne-
groes in to the schools and now they have driven God out of them."). 
55. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 7f!J 
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. f!J2, 614 (1971) ("Some relationship between gov-
ernment and religious organizations is inevitable."); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312. 
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It could mean both a prohibition against tax dollars flowing di-
rectly from government treasuries into the accounts of religious 
institutions, yet insulation of those same organizations from 
some "neutral" or "generally applicable" secular rules that un-
duly inhibit their ability to operate as their faith dictates.56 The 
first consequence of this version of the separation principle tends 
to disadvantage religious organizations relative to others, at least 
in the short run; yet the second consequence has the opposite ef-
fect. Whatever its faults, in no sense is this version uniformly 
hostile to the interests of religious organizations. 
The judiciary may well be free to adopt this or other forms 
of "separation," or to select components of an otherwise unac-
ceptable program of church-state separation-and regardless of 
how dirty, low-down, and double-dealing were prior proponents 
of similar rhetoric. None of this is to say that historical examples 
cannot assist our judgment in these matters, of course. But Sepa-
ration's history need not confine our freedom to decide which 
constitutional principles to promote and which consequences 
those principles should have. 
56. In an exceptionally useful article, Hamburger examines and rejects the evidence 
for a founding era general right to religious exemptions from civil laws. Philip Ham-
burger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992). In addition, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 
(1878), which was apparently the first Supreme Court opinion to quote Jefferson's use of 
the metaphor, id at 164, did so in denying rather than supporting a faith-based exemp-
tion from an anti-polygamy law. But neither history nor precedent prevents us from at 
least conceptualizing an alternative principle in tension with either or both. 
